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Abstract 
This paper compares the loans granted to male and female entrepreneurs by a French 
microfinance institution (MFI). The sample period is split in two: before and after the 
MFI implemented France's regulatory EUR 10,000 loan ceiling. In the first period, the 
MFI does not co-finance projects with mainstream banks and loan size is gender-
insensitive. In the second period, the MFI does co-finance above-ceiling projects with 
mainstream banks, and we observe a gender gap in loan size. The results suggest that 
co-financing leads the originally gender-neutral MFI to import disparate treatment from 
mainstream banks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Female entrepreneurship is advocated as a driving force in economic development. 
Even so, access to credit is still a challenging barrier to women entrepreneurs. Two 
types of gender bias in lending are documented in the literature. The first stems from 
harsher credit approval (Orser et al., 2000; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Fay and Williams, 
1991). The second relates to credit conditions, including collateral requirements and 
loan size.1 We contribute to this stream of the literature by scrutinizing the loan granting 
process of a French microfinance institution (MFI). In France, women account for 47% 
of the workforce but only 30% of entrepreneurs (Brana, 2013). Hence, there are grounds 
to suspect that women find it harder than men to set up a business. 
In developed countries, gender discrimination has been detected in various 
economic activities. The evidence is overwhelming that women are penalized on the job 
market (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2000), confirming that competition is 
insufficient to deter discriminatory practices. Evidence is also found in other markets, 
such as those for cars (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995) and housing (Page, 1995). Gender 
discrimination can thus potentially interact with economic decision-making in any area. 
Unfortunately, data are often insufficient to assess this situation. Because of US legal 
requirements,2 race and gender discrimination has been scrutinized in mortgage lending 
(Munnell et al., 1996; Han, 2004) and in the small business credit industry 
(Blanchiflower et al. 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005). In mortgage lending, black 
applicants face the worst denial rate (Shafer and Ladd, 1981) while female applicants 
                                                          
1
 Riding and Swift (1990), Coleman (2000), and Bellucci et al. (2010) find that collateral requirements are 
gender-related in Canada, the UK, and Italy, respectively. Alesina et al. (2013) and Agier and Szafarz 
(2013a) show that female micro-entrepreneurs receive smaller loans than male ones, in Italy and Brazil, 
respectively. 
2
 The US lending industry is subject to anti-discrimination regulations including: the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) of 1975, which was amended in 1989 to make it mandatory for lenders to report race and 
ethnicity of their loan applicants. 
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experience disparate treatment (Ladd, 1998). Stereotypes thus seem to have survived the 
enforcement of the US Equal Credit Opportunity Act.  
In Europe, discrimination in lending is difficult to test directly because banks are 
not required to release individual data. To get around this issue, we used an indirect 
identification strategy, which consists in observing the impact of mainstream banks’ 
loan approval process on applicants to an MFI. This is made possible by the French 
regulatory context. In France, licensed MFIs, i.e. those allowed to finance their activity 
through borrowing, are subject to a strict EUR 10,000 loan ceiling.3 However, a 
significant percentage of entrepreneurs targeted by French MFIs4 have business projects 
that require above-ceiling loans. To apply for microcredit, these entrepreneurs have to 
secure co-financing from a mainstream bank beforehand. Accordingly, the gender and 
project characteristics of microcredit applicants with above-ceiling projects partly reveal 
how banks treat female applicants.  
In France, as elsewhere, commercial banks are the main providers of small-
business finance (Berger and Udell, 2002; Cornée and Szafarz, 2013), while MFIs are 
new players in the field. By imposing a low loan ceiling on MFIs, the French regulator 
sought to preserve the banks’ prerogative to provide small businesses with loans above 
EUR 10,000 (Brabant et al., 2009). In practice, however, the French regulation has led 
to projects being co-financed by banks and MFIs. This outcome can be viewed as a 
somewhat unexpected byproduct5 of the particularly low loan ceiling enforced by the 
French government (Cozarenco and Szafarz, 2013).6 It can be rationalized by the fact 
                                                          
3
 This ceiling is significantly lower than the EUR 25,000 threshold recommended by the European 
Commission. 
4
 Most of them are unemployed people aiming at self-employment. 
5
 MFIs and banks have different statuses. MFIs are subsidized institutions maximizing social performance 
within a budget constraint, while banks are driven by profit maximization (Aubert et al., 2009). However, 
Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) provide evidence that the social mission varies across MFIs. 
6
 In the United States, the loan ceiling for microcredit is USD 50,000. The European Union (EU) 
recommends the use of a EUR 25,000 ceiling, but member states remain free to set their own rules. Some 
countries (Romania, Italy) have adopted the EU recommendation, while others, like Hungary, Portugal, 
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that co-financing is profitable to credit providers through information sharing (Bennardo 
et al., 2009) and natural complementarities (Fall, 2010). In India, the ICICI Bank has 
entered into partnership arrangements with 30 MFIs (Ananth, 2005). According to these 
arrangements, loan contracts are directly signed by the bank and the borrowers, and the 
MFI acts as guarantor against defaults. This arrangement reduces the MFI’s cost of 
capital while preserving its incentives to monitor borrowers. 
Under French regulations, business co-financing can be attractive to all parties 
involved, i.e. the bank, the borrower, and the MFI, for several reasons. First, co-
financing gives banks access to new market segments while limiting their risk. Banks 
are typically reluctant to finance credit-history-free start-ups. Second, for borrowers 
lacking credit history co-financing may be the only way to launch relatively large 
business projects at reasonable cost.7 Third, co-financing allows ceiling-constrained 
MFIs to attract entrepreneurs with above-ceiling projects. To some extent it also offers 
MFIs an opportunity to free-ride on banks’ screening processes.8  
At the same time, the feasibility of co-financing means that MFIs’ pools of 
applicants become at least partly shaped by banks. We use this feature as an 
identification strategy for scrutinizing the banks’ attitude toward female loan applicants. 
More precisely, we exploit a natural experiment, since we observe the full loan-granting 
process of an MFI before and after the loan ceiling is introduced, i.e. before and after 
the emergence of co-financing. Changes in the pool of the applicants give us insights 
into the banks’ loan granting process, while the profiles of the co-financing recipients 
tells us how the MFI reacts to this process. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Slovakia, and the UK, allow MFIs to grant loans exceeding EUR 25,000. France is the only EU member 
to impose a ceiling lower than the EU recommendation. 
7
 In our dataset, we observe that in three years out of four (2009, 2010, and 2011, but not 2012) the 
interest rates charged by the banks are significantly higher than that charged by the MFI.  
8
 In our dataset, 71% of the applicants with a secured bank loan ended up with a co-financing 
arrangement.  
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Co-financing is still understudied. While the literature cites evidence of co-
financing schemes linking formal and informal institutions in developing countries 
(Jain, 1999; Andersen and Malchow-Moller, 2006, Degryse et al., 2013), co-financing 
between banks and MFIs in developed countries has not been reported so far. This 
might indicate that the French situation is fairly exceptional. Alternatively, one could 
argue that the microfinance industry in developed countries is still in its infancy and has 
not yet fully exploited market opportunities. In 2010, developed countries accounted for 
only 2.6% of the microfinance clients reported in the Microcredit Summit Campaign 
Report 2012.9 
Based on partial-least-square estimations, our results confirm that the introduction 
of the loan ceiling dramatically changed loan allocation in the MFI we have studied. 
Specifically, the institution moved from a gender-neutral allocation to a gender-biased 
one. Before the ceiling was introduced, the MFI granted loans without bank co-
financing, and we detect no gender gap in loan size. After the ceiling was brought in, 
the institution started co-financing above-ceiling projects with mainstream banks, while 
women received significantly smaller loans than men, all else equal. Our findings 
suggest that co-financing has led the originally gender-neutral MFI to import disparate 
treatment from mainstream banks. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the data. The econometric model in Section 3 pinpoints the relationship 
between gender, loan size and loan approval. In section 4 we discuss the results by 
period. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                          
9
 http://www.microcreditsummit.org/uploads/resource/document/web_socr-2012_english_62819.pdf 
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2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Individual data were hand-collected on the applicants and borrowers of a French MFI 
set up in 2006. The database covers the period from 2008 to 2012 and includes detailed 
information on 1,098 credit applicants. The MFI’s pool of applicants is made up of 
unemployed people seeking self-employment, and start-ups lacking collateral and credit 
history. Until April 2009, the institution operated under the unregulated NGO status. As 
such, it was required to finance its activity through subsidies only, which restricted its 
growth. From then on, the NGO changed its status to a regulated MFI in order to gain 
access to funds at preferential rates. Since then, the MFI has been subject to the EUR 
10,000 loan ceiling. Although the change of status enabled the MFI to grow 
significantly,10 the institution has preserved its social purpose.  
Since it was founded, the MFI has used the typical individual microcredit lending 
methodology, charging all borrowers the same interest rate. Over the sample period, the 
interest rate changed slightly due to market conditions, but remained between 4% and 
5% p.a., which is remarkably low given the risks involved in start-up financing. Loans 
are to be repaid in monthly instalments. The average loan duration is 51 months. Loan 
applications are examined by a loan officer, while the credit committee has the final say 
on loan approval. Typically, the decision is binary: the credit committee either approves 
or denies a loan of the size requested by the applicant.11 Loan size is rarely questioned 
by the loan officers because the MFI delegates this task to third parties. Specifically, 
NGOs are in charge of helping applicants define their financial needs and offering them 
business development services. The MFI has however no commitment toward these 
independent—and typically subsidized—NGOs.  
                                                          
10
 In 2010, the MFI opened two new branches and its staff passed from six to ten employees. 
11
 In only 7.6% of our sample is the granted loan size smaller than the demanded one. This way of doing 
departs from the lending methodology adopted by many MFIs, which use loan size as a decision variable 
(Agier and Szafarz, 2013b). 
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The full sample period is split in two. The first period (April 2008-April 2009) 
corresponds to the status of an unregulated NGO. The second (May 2009-June 2012) is 
longer and begins with the enforcement of the loan ceiling. During the first period, the 
MFI received 227 applications and granted 100 loans. During the second, it received 
871 applications and granted 519 loans.  
In practice, the main difference between the two periods is the emergence of co-
financing. Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the change that took place in May 2009. In the first 
period (Fig. 1), the MFI financed projects up to EUR 40,00012 without bank 
intervention. In the second period (Fig. 2), the EUR 10,000 loan ceiling was introduced. 
The holders of below- and above-ceiling projects follow distinct paths. For those below 
the ceiling, there is no change. They retain the right to apply to the MFI directly. In 
contrast, holders of above-ceiling projects are required to secure a partial bank loan 
before applying to the MFI. Their best interests dictate that they apply to a bank for the 
portion of their desired loan exceeding EUR 10,000. Doing so has two advantages. 
First, it maximizes their chances of obtaining a loan from the bank. Second, it 
minimizes the financial burden of their debt since the MFI charges an interest rate that 
is typically lower than that of mainstream banks. Projects denied by banks may be either 
abandoned or downsized to an amount that does not require bank financing. However, 
downsizing can strongly compromise the investment project. Therefore, we conjecture 
that projects requiring loans well above EUR 10,000 that are denied by banks are 
mostly abandoned. In any case, we do not observe the outcomes of the bank application 
process; we observe only the occurrence of bank loans among MFI applicants as well as 
the size and interest rates of these loans. 
                                                          
12
 This threshold was hardly binding.  
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Figure 1: Loan Allocation Process in the First Period 
 
 
Figure 2: Loan Allocation Process in the Second Period 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics concerning the MFI’s applicants, 
disaggregated by period and gender, together with t-tests for equal means between men 
and women.13 To focus on the demand side of the market, Table 1 reports statistics for 
applicants rather than actual borrowers. However, the figures for borrowers are 
displayed in Table 4 in Appendix 1. 
The proportion of female applicants remains similar over the two periods: 38% in 
the first, 41% in the second. For the first period, the t-tests in Table 1 do not detect any 
significant differences in financial characteristics between male and female applicants. 
However, in the second period, women apply to the MFI for smaller loans than men and 
actually receive even smaller ones. The emergence of co-financing is visible in Table 1 
and Table 4 in the Appendix. In the first period, the few applicants holding a bank loan 
(2.7% of the sample) were all rejected by the MFI. In the second period 27% of 
applicants and 33% of borrowers had previously secured a bank loan. Unarguably, co-
                                                          
13
 The sample size is smaller for the first period, which may result in larger standard deviations and less 
rejections of H0.  
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financing went from being a liability for the MFI in the first period to being an asset in 
the second.  
Interestingly, we detect no gender gap in the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan. 
In contrast, there is a huge gender gap in the size of the bank-supplied loans. Women 
also tend to undertake smaller projects than men, probably because the loans they 
manage to obtain from banks are on average 28% lower than those extended to men 
(EUR 45,940 against EUR 33,050). The average gap (EUR 12,890) represents 47% of 
the average project size of female applicants (EUR 27,590). Table 4 in Appendix A 
shows that the sizes of the loans granted by the MFI to women exhibit similar features. 
This gender-specific credit rationing is in line with previous evidence by Agier and 
Szafarz (2013a), who detect a “glass-ceiling effect” at a Brazilian MFI, meaning that 
loan approval is not discriminatory, but women with ambitious projects tend to receive 
smaller loans than men. Presumably, the fact that gender-related disparate treatment in 
microcredit affects credit conditions rather than loan approval is linked to the 
microfinance tradition of serving female borrowers (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). 
Table 1 exhibits large gender disparities in business activities. Strikingly, the 
share of female projects in the food and accommodation sector dropped in the second 
period. This decline could be related to the economic crisis that made the sector less 
attractive.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Applicants 
First period: No ceiling Second period: Ceiling 
  Male Female t-test 
 
Male Female t-test 
Loan approval rate 0.47 0.39 0.08 
 
0.60 0.59 0.00 
Financial Characteristics 
Requested amount (EURk) 18.51 18.10 0.41 7.14 6.80 0.34* 
Granted loan size (EURk) 15.08 17.01 -1.93 7.12 6.55 0.57** 
Project size (EURk) 30.64 29.17 1.47 32.40 27.59 4.81* 
Has bank loan (%) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.28 -0.01 
Bank loan (EURk)a 40.00 92.20 -52.20 45.94 33.05 12.89** 
Has personal investment (%) 0.84 0.77 0.07  0.83 0.83 0.00 
Personal investment (EURk) a 6.79 5.24 1.55 6.62 5.54 1.08 
Business Characteristics 
Start-up (%) 0.84 0.74 0.10* 0.86 0.83 0.03 
Food and accommodation (%) 0.10 0.27 -0.17*** 0.13 0.13 0.00 
Trade (%) 0.19 0.28 -0.08 0.26 0.37 -0.10*** 
Services (%) 0.30 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.36 -0.11*** 
Construction (%) 0.15 0.00 0.15*** 0.18 0.01 0.16*** 
Arts and entertainment (%) 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Other sectors (%) 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.05** 
Individual Characteristics 
Unemployed for at least 6 months (%) 0.57 0.52 0.05 0.59 0.60 -0.01 
Single (%) 0.53 0.69 -0.17** 0.49 0.54 -0.05 
Age (in years) 40.12 36.26 3.86*** 39.04 39.03 0.01 
Dependent children 0.86 1.04 -0.18 0.80 1.00 -0.20*** 
Education  (# qualifications) 2.58 2.95 -0.38* 2.57 3.07 -0.51*** 
Household income (EURk) 1.11 1.10 0.00 1.40 1.57 -0.17** 
Observations 140 87     518 353   
a
 Computed only for non-zero points. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics point to the necessity of controlling for business 
sector in the regression analysis. 
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Table 1 also highlights the change in applicants’ individual characteristics. In the 
first period, female applicants are younger than men and more often single. These 
significant differences disappear in the second period. Concurrently, other differences 
emerge. The second-period female applicants have more dependent children than their 
male counterparts; they also exhibit higher education levels and belong to wealthier 
households. The introduction of the loan ceiling seems to have squeezed out young, 
single, and poorer female applicants. 
Gender aside, Table 1 corroborates the finding that the MFI’s pool of applicants 
changed dramatically in the second period. Practically non-existent in the first period, 
the occurrence of bank loan holders among applicants jumped to 27%. Meanwhile, the 
loan approval rate increased. This increase was probably driven by free-riding on bank 
screening, since the MFI partly relies on the bank’s approval decision. Importantly, the 
average size of the projects submitted to the MFI seems insensitive to the introduction 
of the ceiling, remaining around EUR 30,000. This might indicate that there is a critical 
size for entrepreneurial projects in France. 
 
3 Regression Analysis: Methods 
Our aim was to estimate the period-specific impacts of the applicant’s gender on both 
loan approval and loan size. We proceeded as follows. For each period separately, we 
ran a probit regression for approval and an OLS regression for loan size. In both cases, 
the explained variables of interest include gender (F, which takes value 1 if the 
applicant is female and 0 otherwise) and project size (PS, in EUR). In addition, for the 
second-period estimations, we include the pre-approved bank loan size, if any (BL, in 
EUR, which is equal to zero if there is no bank loan). The control variables grouped in 
vector X include the applicants’ business characteristics (start-up, business sector) and 
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individual characteristics (marital status, age, number of dependent children, education 
level and household income).  
The probit model for loan approval reads: 
  1  Ф	
  	  	  	  
    (1) 
where Ф.  is the normal cumulative distribution function,  is the dummy, which has 
a value of 1 when applicant i receives a loan and 0 otherwise. Variable BL in the right-
hand side of Eq. (1) is absent from first-period estimations. 
The OLS model for loan size is given by: 
  
        
       (2) 
where  is the size of loan i. Variable BL in the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is absent 
from first-period estimations.  
Eq. (1) is estimated by using the full sample of applicants while Eq. (2) is 
estimated on the smaller sample consisting of actual borrowers only. Given that the MFI 
typically grants the loan size requested by the successful applicants, loan approval or 
denial represents the only decision variable in the hands of the MFI. The subsequent 
sizes of approved loans are straightforward outcomes of the loan allocation process. 
The estimation of Eqs (1) and (2) may be affected by multicollinearity, however. 
In both periods, the project size depends on the applicant’s characteristics, possibly 
including gender. In addition, in the second period project holders with a bank loan have 
necessarily passed the bank’s screening process. Their loan size thus depends on both 
their project size and characteristics. To address this double source of potential 
multicollinearity, we used the partial least squares (PLS) estimation strategy suggested 
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by Agier and Szafarz (2013a). At the MFI level, this approach allowed us to disentangle 
the impacts of demand-side and supply-side factors on both loan approval and loan size.  
Specifically, for the first period, we used a single PLS estimation, while for the 
second we performed a double PLS (2PLS) estimation. For both periods, the first step 
involved regressing project size on both gender and control variables in the following 
way: 
  
    
          (3) 
where RPS is the residual project size net of the influence of applicant’s characteristics.  
For the first period, the final steps involved the estimation of Eqs. (1) and (2), 
where PSi is replaced by RPSi obtained from (3): 
  1  Ф	
	
  		  	   
	
  (4) 
  

       

     (5) 
For the second period, we applied a second PLS estimation. The size of the bank 
loan was regressed on gender, residual project size, and the controls. Taking into 
account Eq. (3), we obtained:  
  !
  !  !  !   "
  !#     (6) 
where RPLi is the residual bank loan size net of the influence of all the other 
explanatory variables, including gender and project size. The estimation of Eq. (6) in 
itself reveals information on the screening process at banks. The results should be 
interpreted with care, however, since they may be affected by a selection bias. Indeed, 
we observe only the bank loans of successful applicants who subsequently applied to 
the MFI.  
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In the last step of the second-period estimations, double PLS (2PLS) estimations 
for the approval rate and the loan size were performed by replacing PSi by RPSi (from 
(3)) and BLi by RBLi (from (6)) in both Eqs. (1) and (2). Our equations of interest 
became: 
  1  Ф$
  $  	   $   %
   (7) 
  &
  &    &  '
       (8) 
The structure of the λ and θ loadings is provided in Appendix B. The next section 
discusses the estimation results.  
 
4 Regression Results 
4.1 First-Period Estimations 
In the first period (April 2008-April 2009), the MFI has the legal status of an 
unregulated NGO. It is not subject to the EUR 10,000 loan ceiling, and there is no co-
financing with banks. Table 2 summarizes the results of the first-period estimations for 
the demand side (project size), the supply side (approval rate), and the outcome (granted 
loan size). The estimation methodology follows the lines set out in Section 3. It enables 
us to trace the impacts of gender and other characteristics throughout the MFI’s loan 
allocation process. 
Column (A) reports the loadings of the OLS regression for the project size (Eq. 
(3)). We do not detect any significant impact of gender on project size, suggesting that 
women did not undertake smaller projects than men. This outcome is in line with the 
findings of Bernard et al. (2013) who claim there is no gender gap in small start-up 
financing in France. According to the authors, gender disparities become apparent only 
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for loans exceeding EUR 25,000. The characteristics that exhibit a significantly positive 
influence on project size are: education level and some business sectors. A significant 
influence is observed for three sectors: trade, services, and arts and entertainment.  
Table 2: First Period: Project Size, Loan Approval, and Loan Size 
  (A) (B) (C) 
Explained variable Project size Approval Loan size 
Estimation method OLS Probit/PLS PLS 
Female -6,030 -0.0574 -666.0 
(4,286) (0.0886) (1,658) 
Residual project size -4.55e-06** 0.516*** 
(1.95e-06) (0.049) 
Start-up -4,515 -0.0288 -4,805*** 
(5,002) (0.106) (1,813) 
Food and accommodation 4,202 -0.134 2,904 
(6,576) (0.131) (2,464) 
Trade -10,455* 0.114 -6,423*** 
(5,987) (0.123) (2,172) 
Services -13,766** -0.0203 -5,905*** 
(5,584) (0.116) (2,010) 
Construction -14,559* 0.105 -5,579** 
(7,868) (0.161) (2,664) 
Arts and entertainment -21,388*** -0.130 -11,437*** 
(8,191) (0.164) (3,362) 
Unemployed for at least 6 months -3,149 -0.181** -3,265** 
(3,857) (0.0786) (1,421) 
Single -6,650 0.104 -3,988** 
(4,470) (0.0921) (1,629) 
Age (in years) -317.1* 0.00396 -204.2*** 
(186.2) (0.00382) (72.24) 
Dependent children -1,432 -0.0189 -625.8 
(1,838) (0.0380) (727.8) 
Education (# qualifications) 3,734*** 0.0268 1,797*** 
(1,288) (0.0274) (533.4) 
Household income 900.7 0.04 -396.8 
(1,834) (0.036) (749.8) 
Constant 53,352*** 34,269*** 
(11,384) (4,708) 
Observations 186 186 88 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.189 0.09 0.753 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Column (B) gives the results for the probit/PLS estimation (Eq. (4)). It reports the 
marginal effects at the mean for the probability of approval. Gender is not significant. 
Remarkably, the residual project size has a significantly negative impact on loan 
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approval. This means that, all else equal, the unconstrained MFI shows a preference for 
financing smaller projects, which is in line with its social purpose of serving poor 
borrowers. Among the other explanatory variables, only long-term unemployment 
stands out with a significantly negative impact on the probability of loan approval.  
Column (C) in Table 2 uses PLS estimation (Eq. (5)) for loan size. Again, gender 
is not significant.14 As expected, the residual project size has a significantly positive 
impact on loan size. Several control variables are significant. The size of the microcredit 
was negatively impacted by the following: start-up, trade, services, construction, arts 
and entertainment sectors, unemployed for more than 6 months, single dummy and age. 
The loading of education has a positive sign. However, all these control variables 
become significant in the PLS estimation, whereas in the OLS model (Eq. (2)) they 
were not (we present the results for the OLS model in the Appendix C, Table 5, column 
(B)). This finding suggests that the relationships we find between loan size and the 
control variables are the result of the link between these variables and project size. More 
specifically, among selected applicants, start-ups, businesses in trade, services, 
construction and art sectors, long-term unemployed, single and older individuals receive 
less from the MFI because they undertake smaller projects rather than being directly 
attributable to the MFI’s selection process.  
Overall, we conclude that there is no evidence of discrimination against female 
applicants during the first period, i.e. when the MFI granted loans without bank co-
financing. 
  
                                                          
14
 The OLS estimation for loan size (Appendix C, Table 5, column (B)) delivers a large and positive 
coefficient (2,444) for the female dummy but its significance level is low (15%). 
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4.2 Second-Period Estimations 
In the second period (May 2009-June 2012), the MFI is regulated and subject to the 
EUR 10,000 loan ceiling. This period is characterized by the emergence of co-financing 
by the MFI and mainstream banks. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 provide 
evidence that the regime shift that occurred in May 2009 affected the pool of applicants 
considerably. The regression analysis in Table 3 confirms the preliminary findings. In 
addition, using the 2PLS estimation set out in Section 3 allows us to stress the impact of 
bank loans on the MFI’s loan allocation process. Table 3 has four columns: Columns 
(A), (C) and (D) are similar to those in Table 2. The new column (B) explains the size 
of the bank loan. Naturally, the model in column (B) is estimated on the limited sample 
of MFI applicants who managed to secure a bank loan. 
Column (A) in Table 3 presents the OLS regression for project size. The results 
show that the situation of women worsened in comparison with the first-period 
estimation. The implementation of the loan ceiling is concomitant with women applying 
for smaller projects than their male counterparts. In economic terms, the gender gap in 
project size is considerable since it amounts to EUR 8,922. Importantly, it is purely 
demand-side and can hardly be attributed to the MFI. Plausibly, it is attributable to the 
banks to which entrepreneurs apply for co-financing. Indeed, holders of large projects 
have to secure a bank loan before applying for microcredit. Given that we only observe 
applicants who either apply for below-ceiling loans or pass the banks’ screening 
process, the facts are consistent with harsher loan granting by banks. Moreover, the 
first-period estimation results (column (A) in Table 2) corroborate the finding that the 
female applicants to the MFI do not spontaneously request smaller loans than men with 
similar characteristics. A competing scenario is self-selection, which may result from 
women downsizing their projects in response to the new loan ceiling without even 
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trying to obtain co-financing. However, this alternative scenario is also consistent with 
disparate gender treatment by banks. Spontaneous project downsizing could indeed be a 
rational response from women entrepreneurs to expected rejection by the banks. To 
avert a likely unsuccessful application, women would thus opt for second-best solutions 
in the form of smaller business projects.  
Gender aside, column (A) reveals that the profiles of MFI’s applicants changed in 
the second period. Specifically, the holders of larger projects have different 
characteristics than their first-period counterparts. In the second period, larger 
applications emanate from the food and accommodation sector and from households 
with larger incomes, while the impact of education on project size diminishes. In the 
second period, both the number of dependent children and the fact of being unemployed 
have significantly negative impacts on project size. In contrast, household income gains 
a significantly positive impact. Arguably, these changes could be linked to the 
disappearance and/or the downsizing of projects rejected by the banks.  
In column (B), PLS estimation is used to explain the size of the bank loan. The 
sample is smaller since only 225 MFI applicants out of 799 secured a bank loan. The 
loading of the gender dummy is large and highly significant. On average, women’s bank 
loans are EUR 6,774 lower than those of men with similar characteristics. Admittedly, 
we do not observe banks’ loan granting process, so the fact that women come to the 
MFI for smaller bank loans does not directly prove that banks exercise gender 
discrimination. Still, put together, the project size regression in column (A) and the bank 
loan regression in column (B) raise serious concerns about the way mainstream banks 
treat female applicants. The presence of significantly negative gender impacts in both 
equations is consistent with the banks being at least partly responsible for the demand-
side gender gap that appeared after the loan ceiling was introduced.  
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Table 3: Second Period: Project Size, Bank Loan, Loan Approval, and Loan Size 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Explained variable Project size Bank loan Approval Loan size 
Estimation method OLS PLS Probit/2PLS 2PLS 
          
Female -8,922*** -6,774*** 0.0283 -589.6*** 
(2,622) (1,576) (0.0384) (210.4) 
Residual project size 0.745*** 1.82e-06*** 0.0237*** 
(0.0161) (5.94e-07) (0.00261) 
Residual bank loan -3.19e-06 -0.0885*** 
(2.17e-06) (0.0107) 
Start-up -15,985*** -13,364*** -0.101** -1,211*** 
(3,441) (1,730) (0.0477) (260.0) 
Food and accommodation 22,423*** 18,001*** -0.193** 567.0 
(4,982) (2,993) (0.0778) (387.6) 
Trade 6,806 6,482** -0.183*** 452.3 
(4,142) (2,782) (0.0639) (314.7) 
Services -7,520* -1,334 -0.129** -417.3 
(4,163) (3,138) (0.0647) (311.2) 
Construction -14,482*** -7,310 -0.114 -375.5 
(5,056) (7,164) (0.0791) (384.8) 
Arts and entertainment 7,101 5,167 -0.109 222.0 
(6,937) (3,865) (0.108) (532.2) 
Unemployed for at least 6 months -6,316** -9,618*** -0.0505 -28.41 
(2,558) (1,585) (0.0376) (201.6) 
Single -3,896 -5,266*** -0.0960** -55.29 
(2,932) (1,907) (0.0432) (234.2) 
Age (in years) 39.36 -200.2** -0.00199 14.56 
(123.8) (82.45) (0.00186) (10.15) 
Dependent children -2,712** -2,110*** -0.0410** -214.8** 
(1,281) (811.1) (0.0188) (106.2) 
Education (# qualifications) 1,371* -485.2 0.0173 183.7*** 
(812.5) (530.5) (0.0121) (65.98) 
Household income 5,505*** 3,169*** 0.060*** 235.7** 
(1,261) (722.9) (0.02) (93.6) 
Constant 41,089*** 37,167*** 6,643*** 
(7,451) (4,745) (581.8) 
Observations 799 225 799 492 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.186 0.924 0,0645 0.362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Moreover, column (B) shows that the correlation between project size and bank 
loan size is both high and significant. This correlation explains the strong match (R-
squared is equal to 92.4%). To assess the plausibility of the bank-related explanation for 
the sudden appearance of a gender gap in demand for micro-loans, Appendix D shows 
two additional estimations explaining the amount requested from the MFI. First, in the 
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OLS estimation (column (A) in Table 6) the female dummy is insignificant. Second, the 
2PLS estimation (column (B) in Table 6) shows that accounting for the links between 
both project size and bank loan as well as other covariates renders the loading of the 
female dummy significantly negative. This result reinforces the argument that the 
negative impact of gender on the size of the requested microloans is bank-driven. 
Together, columns (A) and (B) describe demand to the MFI. Although the 
samples are different, the project-size and bank-loan equations deliver a consistent 
picture. This is comforting since the causality between project size and bank loan is 
tricky to establish. Women-owned businesses and start-ups exhibit smaller applications 
and get smaller loans from banks while both project size and bank loans are the largest 
for the food and accommodation sector. Still, a few minor differences are worth 
mentioning. In particular, both being single and being older than average reduce the size 
of the granted bank loan, which seems contradictory. Actually, the loading associated 
with age is small, and age has a low dispersion. The average age of bank loan holders is 
38 and the standard error is low (0.61). Therefore, the significance of the impact of age 
on loan size could be due to a few outliers.  
Columns (C) and (D) are devoted to supply-side estimations. The probit/2PLS 
estimation in column (C) investigates the MFI’s approval decisions. The results show 
that the female dummy is insignificant. This suggests that, as in the first period, the MFI 
applies a gender-blind approval process. However, in contrast with the first period, the 
ceiling-constrained MFI exhibits a preference for larger projects. Consistent with this 
preference, the MFI views a bank loan as an asset. The attraction of co-financing, as 
opposed to single financing, supports the free-riding hypothesis that the MFI finds it 
profitable to build on the banks’ screening process (Cozarenco and Szafarz 2013). 
Noticeably, a start-up status, being single, and the number of dependent children have 
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negative impacts on the probability of receiving a microloan, whereas these effects were 
absent in the first period. 
Column (D) features the 2PLS estimation results for loan size. The estimation is 
performed on the sample of actual borrowers. Importantly, loan size should be regarded 
as an outcome variable rather than a decision variable. Indeed, the MFI typically makes 
an approval/denial decision, and subsequently grants the requested amounts to 
successful applicants. In contrast with most MFIs active in developing countries, the 
French institution does not ration the credit provided to its selected borrowers. This 
lending strategy remained unaffected by the regulatory regime shift. 
In column (D) the female dummy has a negative loading, significant at the 1% 
level. Thus, when the dependence of project size and bank loan on the borrowers’ 
characteristics are accounted for, it appears that second-period female applicants receive 
smaller loans than their male counterparts. Female borrowers are thus worse off under 
the loan ceiling regime. Moreover, in the OLS model (Column (D), Table 5 in 
Appendix C), the gender dummy has a lower impact, which is significant at the 10% 
level only. This suggests that women get smaller loans from the MFI in the second 
period than in the first. Table 3 reveals the loading of the female dummy in the loan size 
equation (column (D)) equals -589.6, more than ten times smaller than its counterparts 
in the project size equation (-8,922 in column (A)) and in the bank loan equation (-
6,774, in column (B)). Therefore, the disparate treatment, if any, is not caused by the 
MFI. Rather, it is already present in the demand function, which emanates from the 
second-period applicants. If anything, the MFI tries to correct the bank-driven bias. The 
higher the residual bank loan, the lower the loan size.15 However, although significant, 
                                                          
15
 In addition, the impact of the residual bank loan on the MFI loan size (column (D)), is much smaller 
than its impact on project size (column (B)). Namely, the first coefficient is 0.0237, while the second is 
0.745, both being significant at the 1% level. 
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the estimated coefficient is small. It is far from sufficient to neutralize the gendered 
impact of co-financing on loan size.  
As expected, start-ups receive smaller loans. In contrast to the results for the bank 
loan, there is no clear pattern for the relationship between the MFI loan size and the 
borrower’s business sector. While the age of the borrower does not seem to influence 
the MFI, his/her education level and household income have positive impacts on loan 
size.  
In sum, the second-period estimation of the approval rate confirms the first-period 
results showing that the MFI makes gender-neutral decisions. However, the second-
period loan size regression suggests that the MFI’s interest in co-financing leads it to 
grant smaller loans to female borrowers. Rather than correcting the gender gap in loan 
size imported from banks, the MFI reinforces it. Importantly though, this move seems 
involuntary, since the MFI's only real decision variable is loan approval/denial, and this 
variable is not affected by the borrower’s gender. Moreover, the first-period estimations 
show that the gender gap in loan size was absent before the introduction of the loan 
ceiling and the subsequent emergence of co-financing. Overall, the loan ceiling appears 
to have a detrimental impact on the size of the loans granted to female borrowers.  
 
5 Conclusion 
Gender-neutral regulations can result in gender-sensitive outcomes (Johnson and Nino-
Zarazua, 2011). Cull et al. (2011) show that profit-oriented MFIs respond to supervision 
by serving fewer women in order to maintain profit rates. Our paper confirms that 
apparently benign microcredit regulations, such as a loan ceiling, can significantly 
affect access to credit for women entrepreneurs. Specifically, we provide evidence that 
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female micro-borrowers are harmed by the loan ceiling imposed on licensed MFIs by 
the French regulator. We also offer a possible rationale for the mechanism underpinning 
this unexpected outcome. A low loan ceiling leads to the development of co-financing 
schemes between MFIs and mainstream banks. In turn, the MFIs are bound to import 
whatever biases in loan granting the banks are prone to. Our empirical findings point 
out the presence of such a bias against female borrowers. 
Women are known to start businesses with smaller external finance than men 
(Coleman, 2000). However, the evidence on gender discrimination in lending remains 
controversial. According to Carter et al. (2007), many of the differences in the bank 
loans granted to male and female entrepreneurs are attributable to structural 
dissimilarities. Therefore, any econometric analysis that finds gender discrimination is 
suspected of having missed relevant variables. In this paper, we get around this issue by 
using an indirect identification technique and by taking advantage of a natural 
experiment. We detect gender biases in banks’ loan allocation by observing their impact 
on the applicants of an MFI which proved to be gender-neutral before co-financing with 
mainstream banks was introduced.  
The main limitation of our approach is the impossibility of estimating–and 
subsequently correcting for–a self-selection bias that might have appeared in the pool of 
microcredit applicants after the loan ceiling came into force. In addition, we cannot 
fully exclude that internal or external factors neglected in this study interfere with the 
change of the MFI's attitude toward female borrowers. Among the external factors, one 
can think of the financial crisis, which overlaps the first period of our sample. Among 
the internal factors, we can mention the growth of the institution, which could have 
affected its governance. Although neither of these factors alone could have generated 
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the observed gender-sensitive change of attitude, it may well be that they affected the 
loan granting strategy of the MFI.  
Further research could build on our innovative methodology and investigate 
whether biases also exist in bank lending against other discriminated-against segments 
of the population. Access to MFIs’ databases could make it easier to check whether 
banks exert disparate treatment based on race and ethnicity. The literature finds that 
non-white applicants can indeed be discriminated against in lending (Storey, 2004; 
Blanchard et al., 2008; Blanchflower et al., 2003).  
The success of the worldwide microcredit industry is at least partly attributable to 
its focus on poor female entrepreneurs who desperately need funds to launch their 
businesses (Garikipati, 2008; Guérin, 2011). It is therefore important to avoid 
introducing regulations that can counteract the women’s empowerment efforts made by 
MFIs (Hudon and Sandberg, 2013). If the aim of the French regulator is to segment the 
credit market, then co-financing arrangements should be prohibited. However, ruling 
out co-financing while maintaining a very low loan ceiling could compromise the 
sustainability of the microfinance industry, especially if subsidies dry up (Hudon and 
Traca, 2011). In any case, forcing MFIs to accept a loan ceiling that is too low to meet 
the needs of micro-businesses is counterproductive. Evidently, the EUR 25,000 ceiling 
suggested by the EU makes more sense than the EUR 10,000 cap introduced in France.  
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Appendix A 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics on Borrowers 
  First period: No ceiling   Second period: Ceiling 
  Male Female t-test   Male Female t-test 
Financial Characteristics 
Requested amount (EURk) 16.27 17.30 -1.03 7.25 6.73 0.52** 
Granted loan size (EURk) 15.08 17.01 -1.93 7.12 6.55 0.57** 
Project size (EURk) 26.58 26.47 0.11 36.77 32.10 4.67 
Has bank loan (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.33 0.00 
Bank loan (EURk) 00.00 00.00 00.00 45.96 37.72 8.25 
Has personal investment (%) 0.86 0.76 0.10 0.87 0.85 0.02 
Personal investment (EURk) 54.44 48.73 5.71 7.56 6.59 0.98 
Business Characteristics 
Start-up (%) 0.82 0.74 0.08 0.82 0.80 0.02 
Food and accommodation (%) 0.07 0.24 -0.17** 0.12 0.10 0.02 
Trade (%) 0.18 0.35 -0.17* 0.23 0.37 -0.14*** 
Services (%) 0.30 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.39 -0.14*** 
Construction (%) 0.17 0.00 0.17** 0.19 0.01 0.18*** 
Arts and entertainment (%) 0.08 0.00 0.08* 0.05 0.04 0.01 
Other sectors (%) 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.07** 
Individual Characteristics 
Unemployed for at least 6 months (%) 0.50 0.47 0.03 0.55 0.56 -0.02 
Single (%) 0.59 0.71 -0.11 0.46 0.45 0.00 
Age (in years) 40.92 35.74 5.18** 38.35 38.40 -0.05 
Dependent children 0.80 1.00 -0.20 0.78 0.98 -0.20** 
Education (# qualifications) 2.71 3.09 -0.38 2.66 3.29 -0.63*** 
Household income (EURk) 1.14 1.33 -0.19 1.54 1.78 -0.24** 
Observations 66 34     309 210   
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Appendix B 
 
The coefficients in Eq. (7) are given by: 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 5: Simple Probit and OLS Estimations 
Period First period: No ceiling Second period: Ceiling 
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Explained variable Approval Loan size Approval Loan size 
Estimation method Probit OLS Probit OLS 
     
Female -0.0846 2,444 0.0440 -389.7* 
 
(0.0893) -1,672 (0.0386) (211.4) 
Project size -4.55e-06** 0.516*** 4.20e-06** 0.090*** 
 
(1.95e-06) (0.409) (1.66e-06) (0.008) 
Bank loan 
  
-3.19e-06 -0.0885*** 
   
(2.17e-06) (0.0107) 
Start-up -0.0494 -2,477 -0.0784 -961.0*** 
 
(0.106) -1,821 (0.0495) (265.7) 
Services -0.0824 1,195 -0.101 138.4 
 
(0.116) -2,049 (0.0643) (311.4) 
Trade 0.0665 -1,031 -0.191*** 416.1 
 
(0.124) -2,202 (0.0638) (315.5) 
Food and accommodation -0.116 737.5 -0.231*** 151.0 
 
(0.134) -2,478 (0.0776) (393.5) 
Construction 0.0391 1,93 -0.0747 275.2 
 
(0.164) -2,702 (0.0785) (386.5) 
Arts and entertainment -0.217 -406.0 -0.123 43.10 
 
(0.150) -3,393 (0.108) (532.5) 
Unemployed for at least 6 months -0.194** -1,641 -0.0547 -313.6 
 
(0.0784) -1,403 (0.0379) (201.3) 
Single 0.0744 -558.2 -0.0965** -172.2 
 
(0.0927) -1,622 (0.0429) (235.5) 
Age (in years) 0.00252 -40.63 -0.00279 -6.679 
 
(0.00387) (73.45) (0.00181) (9.982) 
Dependent children -0.0254 112.5 -0.0363* -158.5 
 
(0.0382) (731.8) (0.0189) (106.4) 
Education (# qualifications) 0.0438 -129.3 0.00995 17.96 
 
(0.0279) (544.0) (0.0119) (65.22) 
Household income 0.0438 -861.3 0.0474** 22.93 
 
(0.0363) (750.1) (0.0199) (95.47) 
Constant 
 
6,753 
 
6,250*** 
  
(5,03) 
 
(580.0) 
     
Observations 186 88 799 492 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.09 0.753 0.0645 0.362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Second Period: Requested Amount  
  (A) (B) 
Explained variable Requested Amount 
Requested 
Amount 
Estimation method OLS 2PLS 
   
Female -189.4 -380.5** 
 
(171.0) (170.0) 
Project size 0.0835*** 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
Residual project size 
 
0.023*** 
  
(0.002) 
Bank loan -0.0817*** 
 
 
(0.00896) 
 
Residual bank loan 
 
-0.0817*** 
  
(0.00896) 
Start-up -902.5*** -1,145*** 
 
(226.5) (222.7) 
Services -50.18 -568.9** 
 
(270.3) (270.4) 
Trade 89.50 127.9 
 
(268.5) (268.4) 
Food and accommodation 451.5 852.0*** 
 
(326.7) (323.6) 
Construction 69.43 -542.1* 
 
(328.9) (327.9) 
Arts and entertainment -60.66 109.8 
 
(449.2) (448.9) 
Unemployed for at least 6 months -450.3*** -191.4 
 
(168.1) (166.9) 
Single -126.3 -21.11 
 
(190.1) (190.4) 
Age (in years) -8.077 11.57 
 
(8.024) (8.172) 
Dependent children -15.11 -69.02 
 
(83.16) (82.93) 
Education (# qualifications) -33.40 120.7** 
 
(52.78) (53.50) 
Household income 13.57 214.1*** 
 
(83.18) (81.67) 
Constant 6,805*** 7,197*** 
 
(492.2) (492.0) 
   
Observations 799 799 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.287 0.287 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
